"Lifqa" (forgery) refers to falsely combining two things into one entity by joining them closely together. "Talfiq" (mixture) is a more general term and refers to two things that are considered to belong together as long as they are connected. Both terms refer to things that are joined together as long as they remain joined together. If they become different from each other after they are connected, this is referred to as "infitaq" (separation). It is not necessary to use the term "lifq" in reference to sewing. (Lisan al-Arab, vol. 10, p. 330). In Islamic jurisprudence, "talfeeq" refers to the compilation of rulings from different schools of law to arrive at a practical solution to a problem. Most scholars consider it unacceptable and impermissible as it can lead to contradictions between the different schools of law. Therefore, one should rely on a particular jurist and his opinion instead of combining different opinions from different schools.

Among the scholars of Usul al-Fiqh (Islamic legal principles), the term "Talfiq" refers to a term that appeared among the late scholars after the legal schools were established and spread throughout the regions and countries. It means compiling a fatwa from different schools of law in order to achieve simplicity and comfort in dealing with religious duties. This is similar to the concept of "Tatabbu' al-Rukhas" (seeking the facilitating opinions) among the early scholars, but with the difference that the latter placed more emphasis on realizing the objectives of the law and fulfilling them.

The common point between "following facilitation" and "talfiq" is that both are based on a taqlid (blind following) and the selection of some fiqh (Islamic-legal) matters from different schools of law. The difference, however, is that the following of facilitation is applied to different matters that do not form a unit or unified worship, such as following the Hanafi school of law in the ruling of wudu, the Shafi'i school of law in the ruling of talaq divorce, and the Maliki school of law in the rules of sale. The aim here is to facilitate and simplify, but without taking into account the ultimate goals of Sharia and their realization. Talfiq, on the other hand, is applied to parts that make up a single matter, resulting in a single ruling that has not been suggested by any mujtahid (a specialized scholar). For example, someone may adopt the Hanafi school of jurisprudence on the issue of leaving the order of wudu behind and the Shafi'i school of jurisprudence on the issue of permission to wipe less than a quarter of the head. Although these are two different matters, they form part of a larger issue or independent matter, namely whether or not wudu in this falsified manner is valid and counts as removal of ritual impurity.

The chosen terminological term means that "Talfiq" is the amalgamation of the different schools of law in parts of a ruling that were not mentioned by any of these schools. (See "Talfiq and Its Rulings in Islamic Law" by Dr. Abdullah bin Muhammad bin Hassan Al-Sa'idi, p. 12, no edition, and "The Principle of Imitation and Talfiq in Islamic Law" by Muhammad Said Al-Bani, p. 91, Al-Maktab Al-Islami Publishing House - Damascus). The Fiqh Encyclopaedia (13/293, term: Talfiq) explains: "Talfiq refers to adopting the validity of an act from two schools of law simultaneously after it has been declared invalid by each of these schools."

Therefore, the reality of talfiq is reduced to the fact that the muqallid uses more than one fiqh school at the same time in the same matter, so this mixture creates a complex structure that is not fully recognized by anyone from whom he imitates. Instead, some of them have accepted parts of it, while others have accepted other parts. Some books have dealt with the issue of 'talfiq' and concluded that 'talfiq' is acceptable when following several schools of law in independent matters that cannot be combined into a single view, such as following the Maliki school in matters of prayer and following the Hanbali school in matters of transactions of trade. But it is more correct to say that following several schools of law in independent matters is not called "talfiq" because it is not necessary for the common people to follow a particular school of law in all matters. The legal opinion of the common people is the opinion of their mufti, and he is not restricted to a particular mufti. It is permissible for him to consult several muftis, regardless of whether the mufti is Maliki or Shafi'i or someone else. Then it is up to the questioner to do what soothes his heart if the muftis disagree, as was practiced without criticism in the times of the venerable Companions. If the layman limits himself to the opinion of one scholar of a school of law and then follows another in a certain matter or category, without a complex picture emerging from it that no one has formulated before, this is not called "talfiq", but it is said that he has moved from his opinion to another in some matters. However, if a complex picture emerges that no one has formulated before, such as following the Shafi'i with regard to ablution and restricting himself to wiping some hair from his head, and following the Hanafi with regard to the validity of the prayer in that ablution without certainty or devotion in his actions, he has combined following the Shafi'i school with regard to ablution with following the Hanafi school with regard to prayer, but this produces a complex picture that no one has formulated before. The Shafi'is say that the prayer is invalid because there is no certainty, and the Hanafis say that it is invalid because purity is not achieved by wiping less than a quarter of the head. In this case it is "talfiq".

The mixing of opinions can be divided into intentional and unintentional mixing in terms of intention. Intentional mixing takes place when someone follows and examines the different opinions of schools and then tries to combine them and make the best of them. Unintentional blending occurs when lay people question different scholars from different schools and then integrate all the answers into a single action.

Talfiq can also be divided in terms of the combined rulings. One type is that two rulings are combined in one matter, such as combining the Shafi'i view regarding non-abrogation of impurities by external touch and the Hanafi view regarding non-abrogation by touching a woman during wudu to confirm the validity of wudu. Talfiq can also be divided in terms of time. A talfiq before the action is undertaken to perform an action, while a talfiq after the action is undertaken to correct a mistake and improve the action to avoid inconvenience.

There is no explicit text on the jurisprudence of "talfiq" by earlier scholars who followed the recognized schools of law. Instead, the subject of this term was dealt with by later scholars. Later scholars disagreed on the jurisprudence of 'talfiq'. Most of the later scholars consider it absolutely impermissible, while some of them consider it permissible under certain conditions.

Five cases in which Talfiq or something similar happens were mentioned:

Firstly, following (taqleed) was introduced to provide ease to the believers and as a mercy to the people due to the disagreements of the imams of ijtihad. Allah says: "And He has not imposed any difficulty on you in faith" (Surat Al-Hajj: 78). For this reason, it is not necessary for the imitator (muqallid) to adhere to a specific legal opinion (fatwa) in all matters, as the majority of scholars say. Instead, it is permissible for him to adopt a legal opinion from one of the recognized four imams in every matter if a mufti gives him this opinion.

Secondly, it is permissible for a mufti to deviate from the opinion of his imam and to judge according to the opinion of another imam. This is due to the developments of times and societies and the differences in weighing the benefits and harms, which vary according to time, place, person and circumstances. Adherence to a single opinion, even if it no longer fits reality, has no place in fiqh. Therefore, the majority of fiqh is based on the fact that there are different opinions and ijtihad methods to suit people's affairs.

Normally, within a particular school of law, it is possible to deviate from the (mashour) views and take into account other legitimate opinions within the school of law. However, it is important to note that this principle is not always applicable and there are certain limitations whereby ijtihad is ultimately necessary or a different opinion is taken.

Thirdly, the assertion that it is not legitimate to combine different opinions leads to the judgment that the acts of worship of the laity are invalid. It is rare to find a lay person who adheres to one particular opinion in all his acts of worship. It is embarrassing and difficult for the laity to do so, and they rely on finding their own acts of worship that may not conform to the terms and standards of a single opinion.

Fourthly, the assertion that it is not permissible to merge legal opinions contradicts the ease and comprehensiveness of Shariah. Something new may emerge in a matter or have new implications. Therefore, the efforts of the older jurists and their limitation to a certain number of opinions do not require a rigidification to one particular of these opinions. Rather, the optimal solution for the mufti facing the new developments of the matter may be to consider several schools of jurisprudence and unite their conditions and provisions in order to bring his fatwa in line with the objectives and nature of the Shari'ah. This merging is not about adopting a wrong opinion of each school, as some conditions of each school are lacking. The aim here is that every scholar in the past time will find some conditions in the constructed matter and will not find others. However, this does not require that his opinion be judged wrong. It does, however, require that he move from one opinion to another, or that he see both as legitimate.

Therefore, Imam al-Shafi'i, for example, requires the presence of witnesses at the immediate marriage ceremony for its validity, unlike Imam Malik. At the same time, however, al-Shafi'i did not say that a marriage performed without witnesses by someone who follows Malik is invalid. Similarly, Imam Malik did not declare the invalidity of a marriage performed by someone who follows al-Shafi'i with regard to the requirement of witnesses.

Fifthly, the statements of the mujtahidun are the same for the muqallid as the texts and proofs of the Shari'ah are for the mujtahid. Therefore, the combination of opinions of the mujtahidun is similar to the agreement of contradictory legal proofs. If the mujtahid's opinion may be wrong or right, the combination of more than one opinion may be closer to the truth.

There are several conditions that must be met in order to apply the combination of legal opinions when it is required. These conditions are as follows:

The first condition is that there must be a need that requires the application of the combination of legal opinions. It is not permissible to do this for fun or on a whim, to shirk religious obligations or out of a desire to present oneself as an innovator of Islamic law. For this would mean disrespecting the valuable opinions and efforts of our great scholars, who over the centuries have created a rich scholarly tradition and intellectual freedom that is an honor to the Islamic community.

The second condition is that the combination of legal opinions must not lead to a ruling that goes against the consensus or against a clear and unambiguous text. An example of this would be if someone were to adopt the opinion of Imam Al-Shafi'i that wine and alcoholic beverages should be treated equally, and then adopt the opinion of Imam Abu Hanifa that wine is permissible. This person would then wrongly conclude that alcoholic beverages are permissible, even though clear and unambiguous texts prohibit the consumption of wine and alcoholic beverages.

The third condition is that the result of the talfiq must not contradict the purposes and nature of the Shari'ah. For example, if someone got married in a marriage without witnesses according to the Madhab of Malik and without a bride-gift according to the Madhab of Al-Shafi'i and without a guardian according to the Madhab of Abu Hanfia, then this fabrication contradicts the purposes of Shari'ah due to the resulting harms such as damaging the reputation of the husband and wife through accusations, the loss of the wife's rights, the facilitation of adultery and zina in general, and the escape of the guilty through this fabrication.

The fourth condition states that the fabrication of legal claims may not be used to revoke an established ruling of a jurist. The principle is that one ijtihad does not revoke another ijtihad. Therefore, inventing legal claims should be avoided because it is blind imitation. An example would be someone who followed the hanafi regarding marriage without a wali (guardian) and then pronounced the three divorces. As a result, his wife became unapproachable and he was forbidden to marry her again unless she married someone else. He then decided to remarry her, following the Shafi'i which states that marriage without wali is invalid. Therefore, the three divorces are invalid because they are due to an invalid marriage. This fabrication of legal claims between the two schools of law is invalid and contradictory. It is as if the person said: When I married her without wali, it was not a zina because I followed Abu Hanifa. But my divorces were not valid because I followed Shafi'i who says that marriage without wali is invalid. But this fabrication is invalid because Shafi'i, although he requires the presence of a wali, does not claim that a marriage based on the Abu Hanifa school of law is invalid, nor does he claim that the divorce in this case is not valid because one ijtihad does not revoke another ijtihad.

The fifth condition states that action by Talfiq should not lead to judicial rulings being overturned. This is because a judge's ruling is intended to resolve differences of opinion in order to avoid disorder. However, if action is taken contrary to the judgment, this can lead to a disruption of justice and unstable court rulings.

An overview of the views of the schools of law in relation to Talfiq

The statement comes from the Hanafis, in particular Imam al-Tarsusi and Sheikh al-Islam Abu al-Saud. Ibn Abidin quoted from the fatwas of al-Shalbi in his work "Al-Durr al-Mukhtar fi Tanqih al-Fatawa al-Hamidiyya". The point is that stopping construction without land is correct according to Hanafi jurisprudence and the ruling on it is correct. However, there is a disagreement as to whether it can be applied to itself. Abu Yusuf allowed the stopping of construction on oneself, while Muhammad forbade it. Therefore, the ruling on stopping building on oneself is a combination of both views and is not permissible. However, in Egypt, the ruling on stopping construction on oneself was often given, possibly based on the permissibility of the combined ruling or considering the land as the property of the builders. In another section of al-Shalbi's fatwas, it is stated that a forged ruling consisting of two different statements is invalid. It is also pointed out that the opinion of the scholar Qasim on the invalidity of a forged ruling may not be applicable to this case due to the difference of opinion of the madhahib, as it is an opinion within the Hanafi madhhab group. It is emphasized that the opinions of Abu Yusuf, Muhammad and other scholars are based on the principles of Abu Hanifa.

Among the Malikites: the Maliki scholar Al-Dasuqi said in his commentary on the great Sharh (Volume 1, page 20, Dar Ihya Al-Kutub Al-Arabiya Publishing House): "What we have heard from our shaykh, who transmitted it from his teacher Al-Saghir and others, is that it is permissible, and it is a facilitation. In general, there are two approaches regarding the combination of prayers in the two schools of law: denial, which is the method of the Masarwa, and permission, which is the method of the Magharba, and I prefer the latter."

In Bulghat as-Zalik (1/19, Dar al-Ma'arif Publishing House): "What our Shaykh al-Amir heard from his Shaykh al-'Adawi and his Shaykh al-Saghir and others is that it is permissible, but it is better not to do it in marriage, because one must be careful in marriage contracts, more than in the other issues."

In the book "Al-Fawakih ad-Dawani" (2/357, published by Dar al-Fikr) it says: "Al-Qarafi said that it is permissible to follow the schools of law and to go over to them in everything as long as it does not go against the judgment of the judge, which is the case in four instances: if it contradicts the consensus, the rules, the source texts or the clear analogy. Therefore, it is permissible to follow Malik in cases such as animal feces and disregard language in contracts."

In the book "Tahdhib al-Furuq wal-Qawa'id al-Sunniyyah" (2/34, published by Alam al-Kutub) it says: "If someone follows a different school of law, it is permissible for him to eat meat from a sacrificial animal if this is allowed due to the permissibility of combining different instructions in a particular form of worship from two schools of law. This is an ease in Islam and the religion of Allah is easy, as Shaykh Ali al-Adawi said in his commentary on al-Kharashi."

The majority of late Maliki scholars support and favor the permissibility of talfiq, that is, combining two opinions from different schools of jurisprudence. However, it is important to adhere to the above-mentioned preconditions; this is not an absolute permission. Ibn 'Arfa al-Maliki has confirmed the permissibility of talfiq in his commentary on the great commentary of al-Dardir, and the scholar al-Adawi has endorsed its permissibility. The scholar al-Dusuqi also favors the permissibility of talfiq.

In their work "Fath al-Mu'in" (4/359), published by Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, the Shafi'i scholar Ibn Ziyad and al-Balqini discuss the question of whether it is permissible to combine contradictory practices. They state that a contradictory combination is only forbidden if it relates to a single matter on which all scholars agree. The scholars agree that combining contradictory practices is not a problem as long as it relates to different matters and does not interfere with taqlid (the imitation of a particular school of law). An example of this would be if someone imitates the views of Imam Ahmad regarding awra (the areas of the body that must be covered in prayer), but at the same time omits a practice recommended by Imam Ahmad, such as gargling water during wudu (ritual ablution before prayer). In this case, the prayer is valid, as the two imams disagree that purity is invalid, which is only the case with regard to one matter. The scholars' opinions thus show that combining contradictory practices may be acceptable as long as they occur in different matters and do not interfere with imitation.

From the Hanbalites there is Sheikh Mar'i al-Karmi. In the book "Matalib Uli al-Nuha fi Sharh Ghayat al-Muntaha" (Volume 1/390, published by Maktaba Islamiya) he said: "It should be noted that many scholars have forbidden the permissibility of blind imitation (taqleed), as this leads to the mixing of legal opinions from all schools of law. This is because in this case each school of law sees the error of the other. For example, if someone performs wudu (ritual ablution) according to the Shafi'i method and then touches a hair on his head according to the Abu Hanifa method, the imitation is not valid in this case. Similarly, if someone touches a hair and gives up reciting behind the Imam according to the three Imams or takes a different position without reciting according to them, this is also invalid. Although this may be justified from a rational point of view and with clear arguments, there are difficulties and burdens in this, especially for the laymen, for whom the scholars have emphasized that they do not have a particular school of law.Several have said: It is not necessary for a layman to follow a particular school of law, just as it was not necessary in the early period of the ummah. I personally prefer the opinion that it is permissible to combine schools of law in certain cases, but not with the intention of doing so systematically. For he who always seeks ease sins. But if it comes to a consensus in a particular case, especially for the laity who are unable to do more than that, then it is permitted. So if a person washes himself and touches part of his head according to the Shafi'i method, his wudu is valid, without doubt. But if he then touches his private parts by following the Abu Hanifa method, that is also permissible. This is because his wudu is still valid, and touching his private parts is not considered breaking wudu according to Abu Hanifa. So if he follows Abu Hanifa in the matter of not breaking valid wudu, his wudu remains valid and that is the benefit of imitation. In this case, it cannot be said that Al-Shafi'i denies the validity of wudu on the basis of touching the genitals, while Abu Hanifa denies the validity on the basis of not cutting off a quarter or more of the head. This is because these are two separate matters. For the wudu was made valid by imitating al-Shafi'i, and it remains valid by imitating Abu Hanifa. Imitating Abu Hanifa is that the validity continues, not that it is started. Abu Hanifa explicitly claims the validity of this imitator's wudu, so he has supported Abu Hanifa in what he considers valid.

To summarize, the combination of legal opinions and mujtahids' opinions is permitted under certain conditions. A mufti may make a ruling based on what he deems appropriate to fulfill the objectives of the legislation and meet the needs of the believers. The questioner may follow the combined judgment if he is certain and believes that it is the correct judgment. However, it is important to note that this topic is only for well-educated scholars and is not suitable for laymen or students. A comprehensive study with practical experience is required to understand the many details associated with this topic. This conclusion provides only a rough introduction and should not be considered a substitute for in-depth study under the guidance of qualified scholars.